Introduction
Theories of heterogeneous firms and trade were developed in response to empirical challenges to old and new trade theory which emerged as micro-data sets allowed to track the production and trade at the firm level. The seminal works by Melitz (2003) , Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Yeaple (2003) provided theoretical explanations for the findings that exporting firms are a rare species and typically larger and more productive than nonexporting firms. In an explosion of work, the scope of these theories of heterogeneous firms and trade was then considerably expanded, in particular to include endowment-driven comparative advantage (Bernard, Redding and Schott 2007) , competition effects (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) and the repercussions between trade, FDI and labor markets.
1
A more recent strand of research has started to address the policy implications of the theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. This paper contributes to this nascent literature. The distinctive feature of our analysis is the focus on country asymmetries. We consider an extensive list of factors that are within the scope of trade and industrial policies and that determine the conditions of doing business: technology access, market (country) size, market entry costs, exit rate, fixed costs to serve (domestic and foreign) markets, the trade infrastructure, and also Ricardian productivity differences which imply that countries exhibit different wage levels. We use a two-sector version of the Melitz (2003) model in the spirit of the new trade theory with a competitive sector ('traditional good') in addition to the monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms ('modern/manufacturing sector'). This allows us to integrate these country asymmetries in an analytically tractable and slim way.
2
Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, we show that trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country, induce a positive selection effect and bring welfare gains to that country but have a negative welfare effect on the trading partner. The possibility that a trading partner is hurt by a country's technology improvements in the modern sector was noticed by Demidova (2008) . However, we
show that even if technology potentials are identical in both countries, a trading partner experiences negative productivity and welfare effects due to a variety of differences in business conditions such as entry costs, exit probabilities and/or wages. Moreover, we show that these effects get magnified as trade gets freer.
Second, we show that strong asymmetric productivity and welfare effects derive from symmetric trade liberalization. Symmetric trade liberalization exerts a positive productivity and welfare effect on the country that has superior business conditions and a negative productivity and welfare effect on the other country. Demidova (2008) has noted the possibility of immiserizing trade liberalization, but her analysis was confined to country differences in terms of their technology potential. We show that such technology differences are not necessary for such immiserization. Again, a very broad set of business conditions which are influenced by industrial policies may account for these asymmetric productivity and welfare effects.
Third, while previous analyses of heterogeneous firms and trade have been confined to settings where the countries are diversified in production, we also study the case where the switch from autarky to trade drives one country into full specialization on the traditional good. 3 Our model plausibly predicts this to happen if countries are strongly asymmetric with respect to business conditions. For that case we show that there are gains from trade even for the country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade. We also show that there is no immiserization trade integration in this case.
Apart from these novel conclusions, a further contribution of our analysis is to synthesize a number of previous policy findings. The tractability of our framework allows us to depict these in a very slim manner.
Previous literature. Our paper is related to an emerging literature that explores policy issues in the standard model with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003) . As we have already noted, Demidova (2008) studies differences in the technology potential across countries. 4 Her work is the one most closely related to our analysis. We shall therefore explain in detail how our results deviate from her contribution, as we go along. Baldwin (2005) and Baldwin and Forslid (2006) are also related in that they study the welfare effects of trade integration, albeit in a model which lacks the comprehensive set of business conditions that we account for. 5 Demidova and
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) study trade policy and welfare issues from the point of view of a small open economy. Hence, the international repercussions that emerge in a two-country setting that we highlight are absent in their paper. Chor (2009) uses a two-country model but focuses 3 The full specialization case has obtained much attention in neoclassical modelling of international trade, however. See e.g. Davis and Weinstein (2001) and Schott (2003) . 4 See also Falvey et al. (2005) . 5 Feenstra and Kee (2008) Our analysis is also related to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who study an alternative model which builds on the linear demand system with horizontal product differentiation developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) . We build on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework, in contrast. This brings a benefit but also a cost. The well-known cost is that the mark-ups are constant. On the benefit side, we gain additional tractability, which is of importance since we focus on country asymmetries along many more dimensions than those envisioned by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . 6 Furthermore, neither they nor the other papers that we have referenced above consider the case where one country is completely specialized in production.
Our paper is also related to the traditional literature on trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies under imperfect competition (e.g. Venables 1987 , Helpman and Krugman 1987 , Flam and Helpman 1987 , Martin and Rogers 1995 and Baldwin et al. 2003 . Of course, this literature ignores the heterogeneity of firms. Nonetheless, there are some similarities between these works and our analysis that we explain as we proceed.
The paper's structure is as follows. Our basic model is laid out in section 2. Section 3 derives the open economy equilibrium with two countries. Section 4 covers the gains from trade and our welfare and policy analyses under the usual assumption that both countries are diversified in production both before and after trade. Section 5 then turns to the case not yet addressed in the literature, where one country is forced into full specialization in the traditional industry. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
The Model

General set-up
Our model is based on a version of the standard monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms (Melitz 2003) due to Demidova (2008) . As in the new trade theory (Helpman and Krugman 1985) , there are two industries. A traditional industry, n , produces a homogeneous numéraire good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and a monopolistic competitive industry, c , produces a continuum of differentiated manufacturing 6 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) address country differences concerning size and import barriers, only. Concerning the issue of tractability, it should be pointed out that the two-sector framework used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is already much more tractable than the original Melitz (2003) model. It is not as simple to use as our framework, however.
varieties under increasing returns. Each variety is produced by a single firm and firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. Labor is the only factor of production in both industries.
There are L workers who supply one unit of labor each. We consider an extensive list of factors which affect the conditions of doing business: we allow for country asymmetries concerning effective entry costs and exit rates, the fixed costs to serve domestic and foreign consumers, respectively, market (country) size, trade and transport infrastructure, Ricardian productivity in the competitive sector and the access to manufacturing technologies, i.e. the technology potential. We first look at a single country in autarky.
Preferences
Household h 's preferences are defined over the homogenous good and the set of differentiated varieties, Ω ∈ z , according to a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility Since households are identical we drop the index h from now on. We assume y < β in order to ensure that the demand for the homogeneous good is non-negative. Aggregate demand for a single variety z is given by
, and total revenue for that variety is
Production and pricing
In the numéraire-sector a units of labor are transformed into one unit of output. 
Revenue and profits of this firm are then given by ( ) ( )
respectively. Hence, a firm with higher productivity level ϕ charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Since all firm-specific variables differ only with respect to ϕ , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten as
where M denotes the mass of manufacturing firms (and varieties) in the market, ( ) ϕ µ is the productivity distribution across these active firms with positive support over a subset of ( )
and φ is an average productivity level as introduced by Melitz (2003) .
Entry and exit
There exists a mass of potential entrepreneurs who can enter the manufacturing sector subject to a sunk entry investment in terms of labor e f . At each point in time a mass of . Once in the market, every firm may be hit with constant probability δ by a lethal shock which forces it to shut down and exit. 8 We focus on a stationary equilibrium without time discounting such that in each period the mass of entrants which successfully enter the market equals the mass of firms that are forced to shut down. Analytically, 
Equilibrium in the closed economy and parameterization
The equilibrium within the manufacturing sector can be characterized as in Melitz (2003) by two conditions, a free entry condition (FEC) and a zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC).
To derive the FEC note that, assuming risk neutrality, potential entrepreneurs enter the market (i.e. incur the entry cost e f w to participate in the productivity lottery) until the value of entry
is driven to zero. Using , the FEC can be derived as
The ZCPC states that the cutoff firm makes zero profits, is the shape parameter. 9 The ex post probability of productivities is then conditional on successful market entry, ( ) ( )
Using these expressions in FEC and ZCPC yields the autarky equilibrium cutoff:
The equilibrium cutoff is independent of the number of workers L , positively related to the elasticity of substitution σ , the fixed labor f to serve the market and the lower bound min ϕ and negatively related to the fixed investment of labor at the entry stage e f , the death rate δ , as well as the Pareto-shape parameter k , as in Melitz (2003) and Demidova (2008) . 10 Moreover, * aut ϕ is unaffected by the labor coefficient in the competitive sector a since this coefficient affects the wage and hence the fixed costs both to enter and serve the market equiproportionately. We show below that countries' labor coefficients affect the cutoffs in the open economy equilibrium, however.
Once the equilibrium cutoff is determined, all other endogenous variables are easily derived (see appendix A). The autarky price level which we need for future reference is given by ( )
and the indirect utility of a household is then:
Countries with a greater endowment of labor L and a higher cutoff are better off. Moreover, it is readily derived that wage increases resulting from productivity increases in the numéraire sector raise (lower) the indirect utility iff ( ) ( ) ( )
3
The Open Economy
Assumptions
We now turn to an open economy setting with two countries
, say home H and foreign F . These two countries potentially differ in a number of characteristics which determine the conditions to do business. There may be differences in country size i L and in the labor coefficient in the competitive sector i a . Technologies in the manufacturing sector may be different: we assume that entrants in country i draw their productivity from a country-specific Pareto-distribution with common shape parameter k but with potentially different lower bounds,
11 Exit rates i δ may also be asymmetric. We also allow the fixed labor input for entry in the manufacturing sector i e f , and the fixed labor input i f to serve domestic markets to differ 10 The statements concerning min ϕ and k refer to versions of the Melitz-model with Pareto-distributed productivities (cf. the references in footnote 4). 11 Demidova's (2008) treatment of productivity differences in the manufacturing sector is more general than ours.
She allows for general country-specific productivity distributions ( ) 
Domestic cutoffs and export cutoffs
Following the approach pioneered in Demidova (2008) country i exports to country j , its profits from exporting are given by
is the export revenue. There is a critical productivity threshold * xi ϕ where such a firm just breaks even on the export market, i.e.
. We call this the export ZCPC. Furthermore, a manufacturing firm from country i that serves her home market i derives profits
is the associated revenue. The cutoff * i ϕ where this firm breaks even is defined by
. We call this the domestic ZCPC. The revenue equations imply a link between export cutoffs and domestic cutoffs,
Throughout the paper we impose the assumption
to ensure that only firms that produce in the domestic market can export (i.e. The free entry condition (FEC) for country i commands that firms enter the market until the value of entry is zero,
. The first term on the LHS formalizes the expected profits on the domestic market and the second term expresses expected profits on the export market where ) ( 1
denotes the probability for a productivity draw high enough to enter the export market. The RHS expresses the entry costs. Using the FECs and the domestic and export ZCPC for each of the two countries, employing the links between export cutoffs and domestic cutoffs, and imposing the Pareto parameterization the equilibrium cutoff productivities are derived as (see appendix C): 
). Intuitively, the overall business conditions for the manufacturing sectors in the two countries must not be too different. Notice that it clearly is conceivable that business conditions are so disparate that a country, call it the 'laggard', is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry and that all manufactures are produced in the 'leading' country. We take this case up in section 5.
Once the domestic equilibrium cutoffs are determined, the export cutoffs are immediately implied by the links 
3.3
Trade balance and open economy equilibrium
To complete the characterization of the open economy equilibrium we have to impose balanced trade. From the perspective of the domestic economy, this is given by:
The LHS of eq. (8) 
Welfare and Policy Analysis
This section assumes that the two countries are diversified in production before and after trade.
Section 5 covers the case where one country becomes fully specialized on the traditional good. 
The gains from trade
The Proof. Proposition 1 is immediately implied by eqs. (7) and (9). By (7) 
Unilateral trade integration and infrastructure policies
We now turn to analyze the effects associated with a reduction of trade costs between the two countries. We start with the case of unilateral trade integration where one country (say j ) allows firms located in i better access to its consumers. This is captured by an increase in i Φ Proposition 2(ii) carries an important message for trade negotiations: it reveals that the incentive to request better market access to a foreign country rises the more favorable is one's own business environment.
Symmetric trade integration
We now turn to the case of a symmetric reduction in trade costs 0 
14 The inconsequentiality of country size was already found in Baldwin and Forslid (2006) , see also Baldwin (2005) . However, these authors concluded that symmetric trade integration must raise welfare in both countries. This difference to our findings can be explained by noting that these authors did neither account for differences in technology potentials nor the comprehensive set of business conditions that we highlight.
Second, our analysis is general in the sense that we allow the symmetric trade integration to proceed from an initial situation where firms face different conditions to accede consumers in the other country, i.e. H Φ and F Φ may differ in the initial equilibrium.
Industrial policies and business conditions in the open economy
Industrial policies have a direct effect on business conditions. Business conditions, in turn, impact on the productivity of firms and on country welfare under international trade. We have:
PROPOSITION 4. (The effect of industrial policies and business conditions under trade).
Lower (7) and (9). ■ Intuitively, any improvement in business conditions in country i , such as a better technology potential, lower entry investments, a lower exit probability and/or lower wages, raises the profitability of the domestic market and gives local firms a competitive edge over their foreign competitors. This stimulates entry in country i and reduces the incentive to enter the manufacturing industry in country j , which sets in a selection effect that leads to higher cutoffs and welfare in i and lower cutoffs and welfare in j (similarly to the case of unilateral improvements in market access that we discussed before).
Proposition 4 provides a considerable generalization of the finding that productivity improvements in one country hurt the other country (Demidova 2008, proposition 2) . In fact our proposition shows that the very same result holds with respect to competitive advantages due to lower wages, a lower exit risk and easier market entry. Importantly, we show that asymmetric effects on productivities and on welfare obtain in the two countries even without differences in technology potentials that were envisioned by Demidova (2008) .
In contrast to the factors considered in proposition 4 the effect of changes in the domestic fixed labor input necessary to serve the domestic market has an ambiguous effect on the domestic productivity cutoff, but an unambiguous effect on welfare as stated in:
PROPOSITION 5. (The effect of domestic fixed labor input under trade). An increase in domestic fixed labor inputs ( i f ) leads to (i) an increase in the domestic productivity cutoff iff the domestic market is sufficiently protected from foreign competition, i.e. iff ( ) ( )
, (ii) unambiguous welfare losses in country i , and (iii) an unambiguous increase in the cutoff productivity and welfare in country j .
Proof. The method of proof follows the one employed to prove the previous proposition. ■ Proposition 5 shows a remarkable difference to our finding for the closed economy. In the closed economy, an increase in f necessarily drives up the productivity cutoff (see eq. (5) 
Trade cost sensitivity of industrial policies
Policymakers should be aware of how sensitive the effects of industrial policies (noted in propositions 4 and 5) are with respect to the level of trade integration. We can show: 
PROPOSITION 6. (Trade cost sensitivity of policies). (i) Consider the effect of changes in country i 's technology potential, fixed market entry investment, exit rate or wage rate on the domestic productivity cutoff (as captured by
* * / i i d ϕ ϕ ). (i-a) Suppose Φ = Φ = Φ H F .
The effect of any such change is the greater, the greater is the level of trade freeness ( Φ ). (i-b) Suppose
, changes in the domestic productivity get smaller by trade integration. (ii-b) Otherwise, the effect on the domestic productivity cutoff is the greater, the higher is i Φ .
Proof. The proposition follows from differentiation of eq. (7). ■ Part (i-a) of proposition 6 carries the important message that the impact of policies that affect the conditions to do business is magnified when the general level of trade freeness is higher.
This finding has previously been obtained in models of the new trade theory and the new economic geography with homogeneous firms (cf. Helpman and Krugman 1985; Baldwin et al. 2003) , the underlying mechanism being the same one as here. Our analysis extends this result to a comprehensive set of factors affecting business conditions. Part (i-b) of proposition 6 is entirely novel. It reveals that domestic policies are more powerful when domestic firms have easy access to foreign markets. Part (ii-a) reveals that if a country is sufficiently protected from international trade (i.e., if
holds true), the (positive) impact of higher fixed labor inputs on the domestic productivity is smaller at higher levels of trade freeness. In case (ii-b), where the country is sufficiently exposed to international trade (i.e., if
), it becomes evident that trade integration even magnifies the (negative) impact of higher domestic fixed labor inputs.
Full specialization in the traditional industry
Our analysis has so far rested on the assumption that the two countries are diversified in production both under autarky and under trade, each country is assumed to have an active manufacturing sector in addition to a traditional industry. However, we have already noted that it is conceivable that one country (the 'laggard') may be forced into specialization in the traditional industry if asymmetries are very strongly in favor of doing business in the other country (the 'leading economy'). This section considers this possibility. We shall assume that the 'leading country' is still diversified in production. We highlight the key results here and refer the reader to appendix E for an extended technical exposition of this case.
Condition for specialization.
We start out with an exploration of the condition under which one country is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry. Using eq. (D1) and Outside this range, one country will be fully specialized in the production of the traditional good:
country H is fully specialized if
. On inspection of these conditions we see that countries are fully specialized on the homogeneous good if business conditions are strongly against doing business in that economy (i.e. if wages are high, the economy is small, fixed investments needed for domestic and foreign market supply are high, entry investment is high, the exit rate is high, the technology potential is weak and trade access is difficult).
Gains from trade. The switch from autarky to trade may force one country into full specialization in the traditional industry. Even in this case there are gains from trade to both countries, however. We can state:
PROPOSITION 7. (Gains from trade under specialization). Both countries have higher welfare under international trade than under autarky even if trade opening forces one country into full specialization in the traditional industry whereas the other country is diversified in production.
Proof. Since we assume that both countries produce the traditional good both under autarky and under trade (such that a consumer has the same wage under autarky and trade), the welfare comparison boils down to a comparison of the price levels. We show in appendix E that even if a country is forced into full specialization by opening up to trade, its price level is lower than under autarky (where it produces both types of goods). The country which produces both types of goods has a lower price level for the same reason as in proposition 1. Hence, it holds true for that 0 , ,
for both countries. ■
To the best of our knowledge, proposition 7 is entirely novel. The country which is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry benefits from the productivity increase of the trading partner. Our proposition shows that this beneficial effect is so strong that it compensates for the fact that the 'laggard' country has to incur trade costs for all manufacturing goods.
No immiserizing trade integration with full specialization. Proposition 3 which was derived under the assumption that both countries are diversified in production showed that one country may experience immiserization under trade integration. This result no longer holds true under specialization. In fact, it is immediate to see that a country that is and remains specialized during trade integration always experiences welfare gains through trade cost savings. We thus have:
PROPOSITION 8. (No immiserization under trade integration). If trade opening forces one country into full specialization in the traditional industry whereas the other country is diversified in production, no country is worse off by trade integration.
Proof: The welfare of a country increases when the price level falls. Use the price indices under specialization (as stated in appendix E) to see that they do not rise by trade integration. ■
The intuition of this result is straightforward. The country that is fully specialized on the production of the homogeneous good unambiguously gains from trade integration because the access to the manufacturing goods that are produced by the other country becomes cheaper. The country that hosts both industries will not be worse off under trade integration.
Conclusion
This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies in a twosector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. We consider an extensive list of factors that determine the conditions of doing business: technology access, market (country) size, market entry costs, exit rates, fixed costs to serve markets, the trade infrastructure, and Ricardian productivity differences. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade.
The analytical tractability of our model allows us to work out these effects in a very slim way and it also allows us to synthesize previous policy findings very compactly. The ease with which the model can be employed to address country asymmetries should make it an attractive tool to study the endogenous choice of policies and to address political economy applications in future work.
Appendices Appendix A -Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under autarky
In equilibrium, the aggregate expenditure on manufacturing has to be equal to the aggregate revenue of manufacturing firms,
, and the equilibrium cutoff (5), the number of active firms can be
The stationarity condition then implies the number of entrants, 
(ii) We assume that only firms that serve the domestic market can export, i.e. * * i xi ϕ ϕ > . From (B3) it follows that this holds true whenever ( ) ( )( ) . However, in the presence of a possibly large wage differential it is quite conceivable that an exporting firm might find it easier to break even than a local firm does.
Hence, the implication will not carry over to our model, in general.
Appendix C: Determination of equilibrium cutoffs in the open economy
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i is given by
, we can write the expected domestic profits as 
The expected export profits are determined in the same manner. Now we use export profits, export revenue, the previous parameterizations as well as the export ZCPC to obtain:
Substituting (C2) and (C3) into (C1) and using ( ) . Hence, we have . Notice that the derivation of the price level is independent from the derivation of the productivity thresholds and observe that it is completely general (it does not depend on the Pareto parameterization).
Appendix E: The model with specialization on the traditional industry in H Consider that only F has manufacturing firms, whereas country H only produces the homogeneous good. The price indices are then given by Taking into account that worldwide expenditures on manufacturing goods must match the sum of wages earned in this sector, 
To show that country H , which specializes in the homogeneous good, has gains from trade, we depart from the utility differential between the case with trade but no manufacturing firms in H and autarky, 
